Cache timing attacks allow third-party observers to retrieve sensitive information from program executions. But, is it possible to automatically check the vulnerability of a program against cache timing attacks and then, automatically shield program executions against these attacks? For a given program, a cache configuration and an attack model, our CACHEFIX framework either verifies the cache side-channel freedom of the program or synthesizes a series of patches to ensure cache side-channel freedom during program execution. At the core of our framework is a novel symbolic verification technique based on automated abstraction refinement of cache semantics. The power of such a framework is to allow symbolic reasoning over counterexample traces and to combine it with runtime monitoring for eliminating cache side channels during program execution. Our evaluation with routines from OpenSSL, libfixedtimefixedpoint, GDK and FourQlib libraries reveals that our CACHEFIX approach (dis)proves cache side-channel freedom within an average of 75 seconds. Besides, in all except one case, CACHEFIX synthesizes all patches within 20 minutes to ensure cache side-channel freedom of the respective routines during execution.
INTRODUCTION
Cache timing attacks [23, 24] are among the most critical sidechannel attacks [25] that retrieve sensitive information from program executions. Recent cache attacks [31] further show that cache side-channel attacks are practical even in commodity embedded processors, such as in ARM-based embedded platforms [31] . The basic idea of a cache timing attack is to observe the timing of cache hits and misses for a program execution. Subsequently, the attacker use such timing to guess the sensitive input via which the respective program was activated.
Given the practical relevance, it is crucial to verify whether a given program (e.g. an encryption routine) satisfies cache side-channel freedom, meaning the program is not vulnerable to cache timing attacks. However, verification of such a property is challenging for several reasons. Firstly, the verification of cache side-channel freedom requires a systematic integration of cache semantics within the program semantics. This, in turn, is based on the derivation of a suitable abstraction of cache semantics. Our proposed CACHEFIX approach automatically builds such an abstraction and systematically refines it until a proof of cache side-channel freedom is obtained or a real (i.e. non-spurious) counterexample is produced. Secondly, proving cache side-channel freedom of a program requires reasoning over multiple execution traces. To this end, we propose a symbolic verification technique within our CACHEFIX framework. Concretely, we capture the cache behaviour of a program via symbolic constraints over program inputs. Then, we leverage recent advances on satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) and constraint solving to (dis)prove the cache side-channel freedom of a program.
An appealing feature of our CACHEFIX approach is to employ symbolic reasoning over the real counterexample traces. To this end, we systematically explore real counterexample traces and apply such symbolic reasoning to synthesize patches. Each synthesized patch captures a symbolic condition ν on input variables and a sequence of actions that needs to be applied when the program is processed with inputs satisfying ν . The application of a patch is guaranteed to reduce the channel capacity of the program under inspection. Moreover, if our checker terminates, then our CACHEFIX approach guarantees to synthesize all patches that completely shields the program against cache timing attacks [8, 14] . Intuitively, our CACHEFIX approach can start with a program P vulnerable to cache timing attack. Then, it leverages a systematic combination of symbolic verification and runtime monitoring to execute P with cache side-channel freedom.
It is the precision and the novel mechanism implemented within CACHEFIX that set us apart from the state of the art. Existing works on analyzing cache side channels [15, 22, 30] are incapable to automatically build and refine abstractions for cache semantics. Besides, these works are not directly applicable when the underlying program does not satisfy cache side-channel freedom. Given an arbitrary program, our CACHEFIX approach generates proofs of its cache side-channel freedom or generates input(s) that manifest the violation of cache side-channel freedom. Moreover, our symbolic reasoning framework provides capabilities to systematically synthesize patches and completely eliminate cache side channels during program execution.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. After providing an overview of CACHEFIX (Section 2), we make the following contributions:
(1) We present CACHEFIX, a novel symbolic verification framework to check the cache side-channel freedom of an arbitrary program. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application of automated abstraction refinement and symbolic verification to check the cache behaviour of a program. (2) We instantiate our CACHEFIX approach with direct-mapped caches, as well as with set-associative caches with least recently used (LRU) and first-in-first-out (FIFO) policy (Section 4.3). In Section 4.4, we show the generalization of our CACHEFIX approach over timing-based attacks [14] and trace-based attacks [8] . (3) We discuss a systematic exploration of counterexamples to synthesize patches and to shield program executions against cache timing attacks (Section 5). We provide theoretical guarantees that such patch synthesis converges towards completely eliminating cache side channels during execution. (4) We provide an implementation of CACHEFIX and evaluate it with 25 routines from OpenSSL, GDK, FourQlib and libfixedtimefixedpoint libraries. Our evaluation reveals that CACHEFIX can establish proof or generate nonspurious counterexamples within 75 seconds on average. Besides, in most cases, CACHEFIX generated all patches within 20 minutes to ensure cache side-channel freedom during execution. Our implementation and all experimental data are publicly available.
OVERVIEW
In this section, we demonstrate the general insight behind our approach through examples. We consider the simple code fragments in Figure 1 (a)-(b) where key is a sensitive input. In this example, we will assume a direct-mapped cache having a size of 512 bytes. For the sake of brevity, we also assume that key is stored in a register and accessing key does not involve the cache. The mapping of different program variables into the cache appears in Figure 1 (c). Finally, we assume the presence of an attacker who observes the number of cache misses in the victim program. For such an attacker, examples in Figure 1 (a)-(b) satisfy cache side-channel freedom if and only if the number of cache misses suffered is independent of key.
Why symbolic verification? Cache side-channel freedom of a program critically depends on how it interacts with the cache. We make an observation that the program cache behaviour can be formulated via a well-defined set of predicates. To this end, let us assume set(r i ) captures the cache set accessed by instruction r i and taд(r i ) captures the accessed cache tag by the same instruction. Consider the instruction r 3 in Figure 1 (a). We introduce a symbolic variable miss 3 , which we intend to set to one if r 3 suffers a cache miss and to set to zero otherwise. We observe that miss 3 depends on the following logical condition:
(1) where ρ t aд ji ≡ taд(r j ) taд(r i ) and ρ set ji ≡ set(r j ) = set(r i ) . Intuitively, Γ(r 3 ) checks whether both r 1 and r 2 , if executed, load different memory blocks than the one accessed by r 3 . Therefore, if Γ(r 3 ) is evaluated to true, then miss 3 = 1 (i.e. r 3 suffers a cache miss) and miss 3 = 0 (i.e. r 3 is a cache hit), otherwise. Formally, we set the cache behaviour of r 3 as follows:
The style of encoding, as shown in Equation 2, facilitates the usage of state-of-the-art solvers for verifying cache side-channel freedom.
In general, we note that the cache behaviour of the program in Figure 1(a) , i.e., the cache behaviours of r 1 , . . . , r 4 ; can be formulated accurately via the following set of predicates related to cache semantics:
The size of Pred cache depends on the number of memory-related instructions. However, |Pred cache | does not vary with the cache size.
Key insight in abstraction refinement. If the attacker observes the number of cache misses, then the cache side-channel freedom holds for the program in Figure 1 (a) when all feasible traces exhibit the same number of cache misses. Hence, such a property φ can be formulated as the non-existence of two traces tr 1 and tr 2 as follows:
where miss (t r ) i captures the valuation of miss i in trace tr . Our key insight is that to establish a proof of φ (or its lack thereof), it is not necessary to accurately track the values of all predicates in Pred cache (cf. Equation 3). In other words, even if some predicates in Pred cache have unknown values, it might be possible to (dis)prove φ. This phenomenon occurs due to the inherent design principle of caches and we exploit this in our abstraction refinement process.
To realize our hypothesis, we first start with an initial set of predicates (possibly empty) whose values are accurately tracked during verification. In this example, let us assume that we start with an initial set of predicates Pred init = {ρ set 13 , ρ Figure 1(a) . In particular, the following traces are returned:
Given tr 1 and tr 2 , we check whether any of them are spurious. To this end, we reconstruct the logical condition (cf. Equation 2) that led to the specific valuations of miss i variables in a trace. For instance in trace tr 2 , such a logical condition is captured via ¬Γ(r 1 )
is unsatisfiable, making tr 2 spurious. This happened due to the incompleteness in tracking the predicates Pred cache .
To systematically augment the set of predicates and rerun our verification process, we extract the unsatisfiable core from ¬Γ(r 1 ) ∧ i ∈ [2, 4] Γ(r i ). Specifically, we get the following unsatisfiable core:
Intuitively, with the initial abstraction Pred init , our checker CACHE-FIX failed to observe that r 3 and r 4 access the same memory block, hence, U is unsatisfiable. We then augment our initial set of predicates with the predicates in U and therefore, refining the abstraction as follows:
34 } CACHEFIX successfully verifies the cache side-channel freedom of the program in Figure 1 (a) with the set of predicates Pred cur . We note that the predicates in Pred cache \ Pred cur ϕ. In particular, we still have unknown values assigned to the following set of predicates: were not needed to be tracked as r 1 and r 2 cannot appear in a single trace, as captured via the program semantics. In contrast, the rest of the predicates in Pred unknown were not required for the verification process, as neither r 1 nor r 2 influences the cache behaviour of r 4 -it is influenced completely by r 3 .
Key insight in fixing. In general, the state-of-the-art in fixing cache side-channel is to revert to constant-time programming style [9] . Constant-time programming style imposes heavy burden on a programmer to follow certain programming patterns, such as to ensure the absence of input-dependent branches and input-dependent memory accesses. Yet, most programs do not exhibit constant-time behaviour. Besides, the example in Figure 1(a) shows that an application can still have constant cache-timing, despite not following the constant-time programming style. Using our CACHEFIX approach, we observe that it is not necessary to always write constant-time programs. Instead, the executions of such programs can be manipulated to exhibit constant time behaviour. We accomplish this by leveraging our verification results.
We consider the example in Figure 1 (b) and let us assume that we start with the initial abstraction Pred init = {ρ set 13 , ρ 
If we reconstruct the logical condition that led to the specific valuations of miss 1 , . . . , miss 4 in tr 1 and tr 2 , then we get the symbolic formulas Γ(r 1 ) ∧ ¬Γ(r 2 ) ∧ Γ(r 3 ) ∧ ¬Γ(r 4 ) and ¬Γ(r 1 ) ∧ Γ(r 2 ) ∧ ¬Γ(r 3 ) ∧ ¬Γ(r 4 ), respectively. Both the formulas are satisfiable for the example in Figure 1(b) . Intuitively, this happens due to r 2 , which loads the same memory block as accessed by r 3 only if key = 255.
We observe that tr 2 will be equivalent to tr 1 if a cache miss is inserted in the beginning of tr 2 . To this end, we need to know all inputs that lead to tr 2 . Thanks to the symbolic nature of our analysis, we obtain the exact symbolic condition, i.e., ¬Γ(r 1 ) ∧ Γ(r 2 ) ∧ ¬Γ(r 3 ) ∧ ¬Γ(r 4 ) that manifests the trace tr 2 . Therefore, if the program in Figure 1 (b) is executed with any input satisfying ¬Γ(r 1 ) ∧ Γ(r 2 ) ∧ ¬Γ(r 3 ) ∧ ¬Γ(r 4 ), then a cache miss is injected as shown in Figure 1(d) . This ensures the cache side-channel freedom during program execution, as all traces exhibit the same number of cache misses.
Our proposed fixing mechanism is novel that it does not rely on any specific programming style. Moreover, as we generate the fixes by directly leveraging the verification results, we can provide strong security guarantees during program execution.
Overall workflow of CacheFix. Figure 2 outlines the overall workflow of CACHEFIX. The abstraction refinement process is guaranteed to converge towards the most precise abstraction of cache semantics to (dis)prove the cache side-channel freedom. Moreover, as observed in Figure 2 , our cache side channel fixing is guided by program verification output, enabling us to give cache side channel freedom guarantees about the fixed program. 
THREAT AND SYSTEM MODEL
Threat Model. We assume that an attacker makes observations on the execution traces of victim program P and the implementation of P is known to the attacker. Besides, there does not exist any error in the observations made by the attacker. We also assume that an attacker can execute arbitrary user-level code on the processor that runs the victim program. This, in turn, allows the attacker to flush the cache (e.g. via accessing a large array) before the victim routine starts execution. We, however, do not assume that the attacker can access the address space of the victim program P. We believe the aforementioned assumptions on the attacker are justified, as we aim to verify the cache side-channel freedom of programs against strong attacker models.
We capture an execution trace via a sequence of hits (h) and misses (m). Hence, formally we model an attacker as the mapping O : {h, m} * → X, where X is a countable set. For tr 1 , tr 2 ∈ {h, m} * , an attacker can distinguish tr 1 from tr 2 if and only if O(tr 1 ) O(tr 2 ). In this paper, we instantiate our checker for the following realistic attack models:
• O t ime : {h, m} * → N. O t ime maps each execution trace to the number of cache misses suffered by the same. This attack model imitates cache timing attacks [14] .
• O t r ace : {h, m} * → {0, 1} * . O t r ace maps each execution trace to a bitvector (h is mapped to 0 and m is mapped to 1). This attack model imitates trace-based attacks [8] .
Processor model. We assume an ARM-style processor with one or more cache levels. However, we consider timing attacks only due to first-level instruction or data caches [8, 14] . We currently do not handle more advanced attacks on shared caches [32] . First-level caches can either be partitioned (instruction vs. data) or unified. We assume that set-associative caches have either LRU or FIFO replacement policy. Other deterministic replacement policies can easily be integrated within CACHEFIX via additional symbolic constraints. Finally, our timing model only takes into account the effect of caches. Timing effects due to other micro-architectural features (e.g. pipeline and branch prediction) are currently not handled. For the sake of brevity, we discuss the timing effects due to memory-related instructions. It is straightforward to integrate the timing effects of computation instructions (e.g. add) into CACHEFIX.
ABSTRACTION REFINEMENT
Notations. We represent cache via a triple ⟨2 S , 2 B , A⟩ where 2 S , 2 B and A capture the number of cache sets, cache line size and cache associativity, respectively. We use set(r i ) and taд(r i ) to capture the cache set and cache tag, respectively, accessed by instruction r i . Additionally, we introduce a symbolic variable miss i to capture whether r i was a miss (miss i = 1) or a hit (miss i = 0). For instructions r i and r j , we have j < i if and only if r j was (symbolically) executed before r i .
Initial abstract domain
We assume that a routine may start execution with any initial cache state, but it does not access memory blocks within the initial state during execution [22] . Hence, for a given instruction r i , its cache behaviour might be affected by all instructions executing prior to r i . Concretely, the cache behaviour of r i can be accurately predicted based on the set of logical predicates Pred set and Pred t aд as follows:
Intuitively, Pred i set captures the set of predicates checking whether any instruction prior to r i accesses the same cache set as r i . Similarly, Pred i t aд checks whether any instruction prior to r i has a different cache tag than taд(r i ). Based on this intuition, the following set of predicates are sufficient to predict the cache behaviours of N memory-related instructions.
For the sake of efficiency, however, we launch verification with a smaller set of predicates Pred init ⊆ Pred t aд ∪ Pred set as follows:
σ (r i ) captures the set of memory blocks accessed by instruction r i and дuard k captures the control condition under which r k is executed. In general, our CACHEFIX approach works even if Pred init = ϕ. However, to accelerate the convergence of CACHEFIX, we start with the predicates whose values can be statically determined (i.e. independent of inputs). Intuitively, we take this approach for two reasons: firstly, the set Pred init can be computed efficiently during /* Extract unsatisfiable core from t r 1 and/or t r 2 */ 15:
/* Refine abstractions and repeat verification */ 17:
REWRITE(Ψ, Pred cur )
19:
(res, tr 1 , tr 2 ) := VERIFY(Ψ, φ)
20:
Pred init := Pred cur 21: end while 22: return res symbolic execution. Secondly, as the predicates in Pred init have constant valuation, they reduce the size of the formula to be discharged to the SMT solver. We note that дuard k depends on the program semantics. The abstraction of program semantics is an orthogonal problem and for the sake of brevity, we skip its discussion here.
Abstract domain refinement
We use the mapping Γ : {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r N } → {true, f alse} to capture the conditions under which r i was a cache hit (i.e. miss i = 0) or a cache miss (i.e. miss i = 1). In particular, the following holds:
Γ(r i ) depends on predicates in Pred i set ∪ Pred i t aд and the cache configuration. We show the formulation of Γ(r i ) in Section 4.3.
ExecuteSymbolic. Algorithm 1 captures the overall verification process based on our systematic abstraction refinement. The symbolic verification engine computes a formula representation Ψ of the program P. This is accomplished via a symbolic execution on program P (cf. procedure EXECUTESYMBOLIC) and systematically translating the cache and program semantics of each instruction into a set of constraints (cf. procedure CONVERT).
Convert. During the symbolic execution, a set of symbolic states, each capturing a unique execution path reaching an instruction r i , is maintained. This set of symbolic states can be viewed as a disjunction Ψ(r i ) ≡ ψ 1 ∨ ψ 2 ∨ . . . ∨ ψ j−1 ∨ ψ j , where Ψ(r i ) ⇒ Ψ and each ψ i symbolically captures a unique execution path leading to instruction r i . At each instruction r i , the procedure CONVERT translates Ψ(r i ) in such a fashion that Ψ(r i ) integrates both the cache semantics (cf. lines [13] [14] and program semantics (cf. lines 18) of r i := GETNEXTINSTRUCTION(P) 21: end while 22: return (Ψ, Pred set ∪ Pred t aд , Γ) 23: end procedure r i . For instance, to integrate cache semantics of a memory-related
Similarly, the program semantics of instruction r i , as captured via φ(r i ), is integrated within Ψ(r i ) as Ψ(r i ) ∧ φ(r i ). Translating the program semantics of each instruction to a set of constraints is a standard technique in any symbolic model checking [19] . Moreover, such a translation is typically carried out on a program in static single assignment (SSA) form and takes into account both data and control flow. Unlike classic symbolic analysis, however, we consider both the cache semantics and program semantics of an execution path, as explained in the preceding.
GetInitialAbstraction. We start our verification with an initial abstraction of cache semantics (cf. Equation 8) . Such an initial abstraction contains a partial set of logical predicates Pred init ⊆ Pred set ∪Pred t aд . Based on Pred init , we rewrite Ψ via the procedure REWRITE as follows: We walk through Ψ and look for occurrences of any predicate p − ∈ Pred set ∪ Pred t aд \ Pred init . For any p − discovered in Ψ, we replace p − with a fresh symbolic variable V p − . Intuitively, this means that during the verification process, we assume any truth value for the predicates in Pred set ∪ Pred t aд \ Pred init . This, in turn, substantially reduces the size of the symbolic formula Ψ and simplifies the verification process.
Verify and GetProperty. The procedure VERIFY invokes the solver to check the cache side-channel freedom of P with respect to attack model O. The property φ, capturing the cache side-channel freedom, is computed via GETPROPERTY. For example, in timingbased attacks, φ is captured via the non-existence of any two traces tr 1 and tr 2 that have different number of cache misses (cf. Equation 4). In other words, if the following formula is satisfied with more than one valuations for N i=1 miss i , then side-channel freedom is violated:
Here N captures the total number of memory-related instructions encountered during the symbolic execution of P.
Refine and Rewrite. When our verification process fails, we check the feasibility of a counterexample trace trace ∈ {tr 1 , tr 2 }. Recall from Equation 9 that r i is a cache miss if and only if Γ(r i ) holds true. We leverage this relation to construct the following formula Γ t r ace for feasibility checking:
In Equation 11 , miss
captures the valuation of symbolic variable miss i in the counterexample trace. We note that trace is not a spurious counterexample if and only if Γ t r ace is satisfiable, hence, highlighting the violation of cache side-channel freedom.
If Γ t r ace is unsatisfiable, then our initial abstraction Pred init was insufficient to (dis)prove the cache side-channel freedom. In order to refine this abstraction, we extract the unsatisfiable core from the symbolic formula Γ t r ace via the procedure UNSATCORE. Such an unsatisfiable core contains a set of CNF clauses
We note each Γ(r k ) is a function of the set of predicates Pred t aд ∪ Pred set . Finally, we refine the abstraction (cf. procedure REFINE in Algorithm 1) to Pred cur by including all predicates in the unsatisfiable core as follows:
With the refined abstraction Pred cur , we rewrite the symbolic formula Ψ (cf. procedure REWRITE). In particular, we identify the placeholder symbolic variables for predicates in the set Pred cur \ Pred init . We rewrite Ψ by replacing these placeholder symbolic variables with the respective predicates in the set Pred cur \ Pred init . It is worthwhile to note that the placeholder symbolic variables in Pred t aд ∪ Pred set \ Pred cur remain unchanged.
Modeling Cache Semantics
For each memory-related instruction r i , the formulation of Γ(r i ) is critical to prove the cache side-channel freedom. The formulation of Γ(r i ) depends on the configuration of caches. Due to space constraints, we will only discuss the symbolic model for direct-mapped caches (symbolic models for LRU and FIFO caches are provided in the appendix). To simplify the formulation, we will use the following abbreviations for the rest of the section:
We also distinguish between the following variants of misses:
(1) Cold misses: Cold misses occur when a memory block is accessed for the first time. (2) Conflict misses: All cache misses that are not cold misses are referred to as conflict misses.
Formulating conditions for cold misses. Cold cache misses occur when a memory block is accessed for the first time during program execution. In order to check whether r i suffers a cold miss, we check whether all instructions r ∈ {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r i−1 } access different memory blocks than the memory block accessed by r i . This is captured as follows:
Recall captures that all instructions between r j and r i either access a different memory block than r i (hence, satisfying ρ t aд ki ∨ ¬ρ set ki ) or does not appear in the execution trace (hence, satisfying ¬дuard k ).
Given the intuition mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, we conclude that r i suffers a conflict miss if both ϕ
Computing Γ(r i ). For direct-mapped caches, r i can be a cache miss if it is either a cold cache miss or a conflict miss. Hence, Γ(r i ) is captured symbolically as follows:
Property for cache side-channel freedom
In this paper, we instantiate our checker for timing-based attacks [14] and trace-based attacks [8] as follows.
Timing-based attacks. In timing-based attacks, an attacker aims to distinguish traces based on their timing. In our framework, we verify the following property to ensure cache side-channel freedom:
N captures the number of symbolically executed, memory-related instructions. sol( N i=1 miss i ) captures the number of valuations of N i=1 miss i . Intuitively, Equation 19 aims to check that the underlying program has exactly one cache behaviour, in terms of the total number of cache misses.
Trace-based attacks. In trace-based attacks, an attacker monitors the cache behaviour of each memory access. We define a partial function ξ : {r 1 , . . . , r N } ↛ {0, 1} as follows:
The following verification goal ensures side-channel freedom:
where dom(ξ ) captures the domain of ξ , ∥ captures the ordered (with respect to the indexes of r i ) concatenation operation and X = ⟨|dom(ξ )| , ∥ r i ∈dom(ξ ) ξ (r i )⟩. Intuitively, we check whether there exists exactly one cache behaviour sequence.
RUNTIME MONITORING
CACHEFIX produces the first real counterexample when it discovers two traces with different observations (w.r.t. attack model O). These traces are then analyzed to compute a set of runtime actions that are guaranteed to reduce the uncertainty to guess sensitive inputs. Overall, our runtime monitoring involves the following crucial steps:
• We analyze a counterexample trace tr and extract the symbolic condition for which the same trace would be generated, • We systematically explore unique counterexamples with the objective to reduce the uncertainty to guess sensitive inputs, • We compute a set of runtime actions that need to be applied for improving the cache side-channel freedom.
In the following, we discuss these three steps in more detail.
Analyzing a counterexample trace. Given a real counterexample trace, we extract a symbolic condition that captures all the inputs for which the same counterexample trace can be obtained. Thanks to the symbolic nature of our analysis, CACHEFIX already includes capabilities to extract these monitors as follows. 
where miss
is the valuation of symbolic variable miss i in trace. We note that ν ⇒ ¬Γ(r j ) for any r j that does not appear in trace (i.e. r j trace). Hence, to formulate ν , it was sufficient to consider only the instructions that appear in trace.
Once we extract a monitor ν from counterexample trace, the symbolic system Ψ is refined to Ψ ∧ ¬ν . This is to ensure that we only explore unique counterexample traces.
Systematic exploration of counterexamples. The order of exploring counterexamples is crucial to satisfy monotonicity, i.e., to reduce the channel capacity (a standard metric to quantify the information flow from sensitive input to attacker observation) of P with each round of patch generation. To this end, CACHEFIX employs a strategy that can be visualized as an exploration of the equivalence classes of observations (e.g. #cache misses), i.e., we explore all counterexamples in the same equivalence class in one shot. In order to find another counterexample exhibiting the same observation as observation o, we modify the verification goal as follows, for timing and trace-based attacks, respectively (cf. Equation 20 for ξ ):
where To explore a different equivalence class of observation than that of observation o, CACHEFIX negates the verification goal. For O t ime , as an example, the verification goal is changed as follows:
We note that Equation 24 is satisfiable if and only if there exists an execution trace with observation differing from o.
Runtime actions to improve side-channel freedom. Our checker maintains the record of all explored observations and the symbolic conditions capturing the equivalence classes of respective observations. At each round of patch (i.e. runtime action) synthesis, we walk through this record and compute the necessary runtime actions for improving cache side-channel freedom.
. . , ⟨ν k , o k ⟩} where each o i captures a unique number of observed cache misses and ν i symbolically captures all inputs that lead to observation o i . Our goal is to manipulate executions so that they lead to the same number of cache misses. To this end, the patch synthesis stage determines the amount of cache misses that needs to be added for each element in Ω. Concretely, the set of runtime actions generated are as follows:
In practice, when a program is run with input I , we check whether I ∈ ν x for some x ∈ [1, k]. Subsequently, max i ∈[1,k ] o i − o x cache misses were injected before the program starts executing.
O trace . During trace-based attacks, the attacker makes an observation on the sequence of cache hits and misses in an execution trace. Therefore, our goal is to manipulate executions in such a fashion that all execution traces lead to the same sequence of cache hits and misses. To accomplish this, each runtime action involves the injection of cache misses or hits before execution, after execution or at an arbitrary point of execution. It also involves invalidating an address in cache. Concretely, this is formalized as follows:
where ν i captures the symbolic input condition where the runtime actions are employed. For any input satisfying ν i , we count the number of instructions executed. If the number of executed instructions reaches c j , then we perform the action a j (e.g. injecting hits/misses or invalidating an address in cache), for any j ∈ [1, k].
As an example, consider a trace-based attack in the example of Figure 1 (b). Our checker will manipulate counterexample traces by injecting cache misses and hits as follows (injected cache hits and misses are highlighted in bold): tr ′′ 1 ≡ ⟨miss, miss, hit, hit⟩; tr ′′ 2 ≡ ⟨miss, miss, hit, hit⟩ Therefore, the following actions are generated to ensure cache sidechannel freedom against trace-based attacks:
We use string alignment algorithm [6] to make two traces equivalent (via insertion of cache hits/misses or substitution of hits to misses).
Practical consideration. In practice, the injection of a cache miss can be performed via accessing a fresh memory block (cf. Figure 1(d) ). However, unless the injection of a cache miss happens to be in the beginning or at the end of execution, the cache needs to be disabled before and enabled after such a cache miss. Consequently, our injection of misses does not affect cache states. In ARM-based processor, this is accomplished via manipulating the C bit of CP15 register. The injection of a cache hit can be performed via tracking the last accessed memory address and re-accessing the same address.
To change a cache hit to a cache miss, the accessed memory address needs to be invalidated in the cache. CACHEFIX symbolically tracks the memory address accessed at each memory-related instruction. When the program is run with input I ∈ ν i , we concretize all memory addresses with respect to I . Hence, while applying an action that involves cache invalidation, we know the exact memory address that needs to be invalidated. In ARM-based processor, the instruction MCR provides capabilities to invalidate an address in the cache.
We note the preceding manipulations on an execution requires additional registers. We believe this is possible by using some system register or using a locked portion in the cache.
Properties guaranteed by CacheFix. CACHEFIX satisfies the following crucial properties (proofs are included in the appendix) on channel capacity, shannon entropy and min entropy; which are standard metrics to quantify the information flow from sensitive inputs to the attacker observation. 
IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
Implementation setup. The input to CACHEFIX is the target program and a cache configuration. We have implemented CACHEFIX on top of CBMC bounded model checker [1] . It first builds a formula representation of the input program via symbolic execution. Then, it checks the (un)satisfiability of this formula against a specification property. Despite being a bounded model checker, CBMC is used as a classic verification tool in our experiments. In particular for program loops, CBMC first attempts to derive loop bounds automatically. If CBMC fails to derive certain loop bounds, then the respective loop bounds need to be provided manually. Nevertheless, during the verification process, CBMC checks all manually provided loop bounds and the verification fails if any such bound was erroneous.
In our experiments, all loop bounds were automatically derived by CBMC. In short, if CACHEFIX successfully verifies a program, then the respective program exhibits cache side-channel freedom for the given cache configuration and targeted attack models.
The implementation of our checker impacts the entire workflow of CBMC. We first modify the symbolic execution engine of CBMC to insert the predicates related to cache semantics. As a result, upon the termination of symbolic execution, the formula representation of the program encodes both the cache semantics and the program semantics. Secondly, we systematically rewrite this formula based on our abstraction refinement, with the aim of verifying cache side-channel freedom. Finally, we modify the verification engine of CBMC to systematically explore different counterexamples, instrument patches and refining the side-channel freedom properties on-the-fly. To manipulate and solve symbolic formulas, we leverage Z3 theorem prover. All reported experiments were performed on an Intel I7 machine, having 8GB RAM and running OSX.
Subject programs and cache. We have chosen security-critical subjects from OpenSSL [5], GDK [3] , arithmetic routines from libfixedtimefixedpoint [4] and elliptic curve routines from FourQlib [2] to evaluate CACHEFIX (cf. Table 1 ). We include representative routines exhibiting constant cache-timing, as well as routines exhibiting variable cache timing. We set the default cache to be 1KB direct-mapped, with a line size of 32 bytes.
Efficiency of checking. Table 1 captures a summary of our evaluation for CACHEFIX. The outcome of this evaluation is either a successful verification (✓) or a non-spurious counterexample (✗). CACHEFIX accomplished the verification tasks for all subjects only within a few minutes. The maximum time taken by our checker was 390 seconds for the routine fix_pow -a constant time implementation of powers (x y ). fix_pow has complex memory access patterns, however, its flat structure ensures cache side-channel freedom.
To check the effectiveness of our abstraction refinement process, we compare CACHEFIX with a variant of our checker where all predicates in Pred set ∪ Pred t aд are considered. Therefore, such a variant does not employ any abstraction refinement, as the set of predicates Pred set ∪ Pred t aд is sufficient to determine the cache behaviour of all instructions in the program. We compare CACHEFIX with this variant in terms of the number of predicates, as well as the verification time. We record the set of predicates Pred cur considered in CACHEFIX when it terminates with a successful verification (✓) or a real counterexample (✗). Table 1 clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of our abstraction refinement process. Specifically, for AES, DES and fix_pow, the checker does not terminate in ten minutes when all predicates in Pred set ∪ Pred t aд are considered during the verification process. In general, the refinement process reduces the number of considered predicates by a factor of 1.81x on average. This leads to a substantial improvement in verification time, as observed from Table 1 .
The routines chosen from OpenSSL library are single path programs. However, AES and DES exhibit input-dependent memory accesses, hence, violating side-channel freedom. The other routines violate cache side-channel freedom due to input-dependent loop trip counts. For example, routines chosen from the GDK library employ a binary search of the input keystroke over a large table. We note that both libfixedtimefixedpoint and FourQlib libraries include comments involving the security risks in fix_frac and ecc_point_validate (cf. validate in Table 1 ).
CacheFix verifies or generates real counterexamples at an average within 70.38 secs w.r.t. attack model O t ime and at an average within 74.12 secs w.r.t. O t r ace . Moreover, the abstraction refinement process embodied within CacheFix substantially reduces the verification time as opposed to when no refinement process was employed.
Overhead from monitors. We evaluated the time taken by CACHE-FIX for counterexample exploration and patch generation (cf. Section 5). For each generated patch, we have also evaluated the overhead induced by the same at runtime (cf. Table 2) . Table 2 captures the maximum and average overhead induced by CACHEFIX at runtime. We compute the overhead via the number of additional runtime actions (i.e. cache misses, hits or invalidations) introduced solely via CACHEFIX. In absolute terms, the maximum (average) overhead captures the maximum (average) number of runtime actions induced over all equivalence classes. The maximum overhead was introduced in case of DES -300 actions for O t ime and 371 actions for O t r ace . This is primarily due to the difficulty in making a large number of traces equivalent in terms of the number of cache misses and the sequence of hit/miss, respectively. Although the number of actions introduced by CACHEFIX is non-negligible, we note that their effect is minimal on the overall execution. To this end, we execute the program for 100 different inputs in each explored equivalence class and measure the overhead introduced by CACHEFIX (cf. "% actions" in Table 2 ) with respect to the total number of instructions executed. We observe that the maximum overhead reaches up to 3.2% and the average overhead is up to 2.1%. We believe this overhead is acceptable in the light of cache side-channel freedom guarantees provided by CACHEFIX. Except AES and DES, the cache behaviour of a single program path is independent of program inputs. For the respective subjects, exactly the same number of equivalence classes were explored for both attack models (cf. Table 2 ). Each explored equivalence class was primarily attributed to a unique program path. Nevertheless, due to more involved computations (cf. Section 5), the overhead of CACHEFIX in attack model O t r ace is higher than the overhead in attack model O t ime . As observed from Table 2 , CACHEFIX discovers significantly more equivalence classes w.r.t. attack model O t r ace as compared to the number of equivalence classes w.r.t. attack model O t ime . This implies AES is more vulnerable to O t r ace as compared to O t ime . Excluding DES subject to O t r ace , our exploration terminates in all scenarios within 20 mins.
To explore counterexample and generate patches, CacheFix takes 2.27x more time with O t r ace , as compared to O t ime . Moreover, excluding DES, CacheFix explores all equivalence classes of observations within 20 minutes in all scenarios. Finally, the runtime overhead induced by CacheFix is only up to 3.2% with respect to the number of executed instructions. Sensitivity w.r.t. cache configuration. We evaluated CACHEFIX for a variety of cache associativity (1-way, 2-way and 4-way), cache size (from 1KB to 8KB) and with LRU as well as FIFO replacement policies (detailed experiments are included in the appendix). We observed that the verification time increases marginally (about 7%) when set-associative caches were used instead of direct-mapped caches and does not vary significantly with respect to replacement policy. Finally, we observed changes in the number of equivalence classes of observations for both AES and DES while running these subjects with different replacement policies. However, neither AES nor DES satisfied cache side-channel freedom for any of the cache size and replacement policies tested in our evaluation. The relatively low verification time results from the fact that the total number of predicates (i.e. Pred set ∪ Pred t aд ) is independent of cache size and replacement policy. Nevertheless, the symbolic encoding for setassociative caches is more involved than direct-mapped caches. This results in an average increase to the number of predicates considered for verification (i.e. Pred cur ) by a factor of 1.5x. However, such an increased number of predicates does not translate to significant verification timing for set-associative caches.
REVIEW OF PRIOR WORKS
Earlier works on cache analysis are based on abstract interpretation [35] and its combination with model checking [18] , to estimate the worst-case execution time (WCET) of a program. In contrast to these approaches, CACHEFIX automatically builds and refine the abstraction of cache semantics for verifying side-channel freedom. Cache attacks are one of the most critical side-channel attacks [8, 14, 25-28, 32, 37, 38] . In contrast to the literature on side-channel attacks, we do not engineer new cache attacks in this paper. Based on a configurable attack model, CACHEFIX verifies and reinstates the cache side-channel freedom of arbitrary programs.
Orthogonal to approaches proposing countermeasures [21, 36] , the fixes generated by CACHEFIX is guided by program verification output. Thus, CACHEFIX can provide cache side-channel freedom guarantees about the fixed program. Moreover, CACHEFIX can be leveraged to formally verify whether existing countermeasures are capable to ensure side-channel freedom.
In contrast to recent approaches on statically analyzing cache side channels [15, 22, 29, 30] , our CACHEFIX approach automatically constructs and refines the abstractions for verifying cache sidechannel freedom. Moreover, contrary to CACHEFIX, approaches based on static analysis are not directly applicable when the underlying program does not satisfy cache side-channel freedom. CACHE-FIX targets verification of arbitrary software programs, over and above constant-time implementations [9, 12] . Existing works based on symbolic execution [11, 34] , taint analysis [20, 33] and verifying timing-channel freedom [10] ignore cache attacks. Moreover, these works do not provide capabilities for automatic abstraction refinement and patch synthesis for ensuring side-channel freedom. Finally, in contrast to these works, we show that our CACHEFIX approach scales with routines from real cryptographic libraries.
Finally, recent approaches on testing and quantifying cache sidechannel leakage [13, 16, 17] are complementary to CACHEFIX. These works have the flavour of testing and and they do not provide capabilities to ensure cache side-channel freedom.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we propose CACHEFIX, a novel approach to automatically verify and restore cache side-channel freedom of arbitrary programs. The key novelty in our approach is two fold. Firstly, our CACHEFIX approach automatically builds and refines abstraction of cache semantics. Although targeted to verify cache side-channel freedom, we believe CACHEFIX is applicable to verify other cache timing properties, such as WCET. Secondly, the core symbolic engine of CACHEFIX systematically combines its reasoning power with runtime monitoring to ensure cache side-channel freedom during program execution. Our evaluation reveals promising results, for 25 routines from several cryptographic libraries, CACHEFIX (dis)proves cache side-channel freedom within an average 75 seconds. Moreover, in most scenarios, CACHEFIX generated patches within 20 minutes to ensure cache side-channel freedom during program execution. Despite this result, we believe that CACHEFIX is only an initial step for the automated verification of cache side-channel freedom. In particular, we do not account cache attacks that are more powerful than timing or trace-based attacks. Besides, we do not implement the synthesized patches in a commodity embedded system to check their performance impact. We hope that the community will take this effort forward and push the adoption of formal tools for the evaluation of cache side-channel. For reproducibility and research, our tool and all experimental data are publicly available: (blinded)
Theoretical Guarantees
In this section, we include the detailed proof of the properties satisfied by CACHEFIX. PROPERTY 3. (Monotonicity) Consider a victim program P with sensitive input K. Given attack models O t ime or O t r ace , assume that the channel capacity to quantify the uncertainty of guessing K is G P cap . CacheFix guarantees that G P cap monotonically decreases with each synthesized patch (cf. Equation [25] [26] employed at runtime.
PROOF. Consider the generic attack model O : {h, m} * → X that maps each trace to an element in the countable set X. For a victim program P, assume TR ⊆ {h, m} * is the set of all execution traces. After one round of patch synthesis, assume TR ′ ⊆ {h, m} * is the set of all execution traces in P when the synthesized patches are applied at runtime. By construction, each round of patch synthesis merges two equivalence classes of observations (cf. Algorithm 3), hence, making them indistinguishable by the attacker O. As a result, the following relationship holds:
Channel capacity G P cap equals to log |O(TR)| for the original program P, but it reduces to log |O (TR ′ ) | when the synthesized patches are applied. We conclude the proof as the same argument holds for any round of patch synthesis. □ PROPERTY 4. (Convergence) Let us assume a victim program P with sensitive input K. In the absence of any attacker, assume that the uncertainty to guess K is G init cap , G init shn and G init min , via channel capacity, Shannon entropy and Min entropy, respectively. If our checker terminates and all synthesized patches are applied at runtime, then our framework guarantees that the channel capacity (respectively, Shannon entropy and Min entropy) will remain G init cap (respectively, G init shn and G init min ) even in the presence of attacks captured via O t ime and O t r ace .
PROOF. Consider the generic attack model O : {h, m} * → X, mapping each execution trace to an element in the countable set X. We assume a victim program P that exhibits a set of execution traces TR ⊆ {h, m} * . From Equation 27 , we know that |O(TR)| decreases with each round of patch synthesis. Given that our checker terminates, we obtain the program P, together with a set of synthesized patches that are applied when P executes. Assume TR f ∈ {h, m} * is the set of execution traces obtained from P when all patches are systematically applied. Clearly, O TR f = 1.
The channel capacity of P, upon the termination of our checker, is log O TR f = log 1 = 0. This concludes that the channel capacity does not change even in the presence of attacks O t ime and O t r ace .
For a given distribution λ of sensitive input K, Shannon entropy G init shn is computed as follows:
where K captures the domain of sensitive input K. For a given equivalence class of observation o ∈ O TR f , the remaining uncertainty is computed as follows:
λ o (K) captures the probability that the sensitive input is K, given the observation o is made by the attacker. Finally, to evaluate the remaining uncertainty of the patched program version, G f inal shn (λ o ) is averaged over all equivalence class of observations as follows:
where pr (o) captures the probability of the observation o ∈ O TR f .
However, we have O TR f = 1. Hence, for any o ∈ O TR f , we get pr (o) = 1 and λ o (K) = λ(K). Plugging these observations into Equation 30 and Equation 29, we get the following:
Finally, for a given distribution λ of sensitive input K, the min entropy G init min is computed as follows:
Therefore, min entropy captures the best strategy of an attacker, that is, to choose the most probable secret.
Similar to Shannon entropy, for a given equivalence class of observation o ∈ O TR f , the remaining uncertainty is computed as follows:
λ o (K) captures the probability that the sensitive input is K, given the observation o is made by the attacker. Finally, we obtain the min entropy of the patched program version via the following relation: 
Modeling LRU and FIFO cache semantics
To formulate the conditions for conflict misses in set-associative caches, it is necessary to understand the notion of cache conflict. We use the following definition of cache conflict to formulate Γ(r i ):
(Cache conflict) r j generates a cache conflict to r i if and only if 1 ≤ j < i, σ (r j ) σ (r i ) and the execution of r j can change the relative position of σ (r i ) within the set(r i )-state immediately before instruction r i .
Recall that σ (r i ) captures the memory block accessed at r i and set(r i ) captures the cache set accessed by r i . The state of a cache set is an ordered A-tuple -capturing the relative positions of all memory blocks within the respective cache set. For instance, ⟨m 1 , m 2 ⟩ captures the state of a two-associative cache set. The rightmost memory block (i.e. m 2 ) captures the first memory block to be evicted from the cache set if a block m {m 1 , m 2 } is accessed and mapped to the same cache set. where x = {lru, f i f o}. Concretely, η ji is set to 1 if r j creates a unique cache conflict to r i and η ji is set to 0 otherwise.
Computing Γ(r i ) for Set-associative Caches. To formulate Γ(r i ) for set-associative caches, we need to check whether the number of unique cache conflicts to r i exceeds the associativity (A) of the cache. Based on this intuition, we formalize Γ(r i ) for set-associative caches as follows:
We note that j ∈[1,i) η ji accurately counts the number of unique cache conflicts to the instruction r i (cf. Equation 40-Equation 41). Hence, the condition j ∈[1,i) η ji ≥ A precisely captures whether σ (r i ) is replaced from the cache before r i is executed. If r i does not suffer a cold miss and j ∈[1,i) η ji < A , then r i will be a cache hit when executed, as captured by the condition ¬Γ(r i ). 
Detailed Runtime Monitoring

Additional Experimental Results
Sensitivity w.r.t. cache. Figure 4 outlines the evaluation for routines that violate side-channel freedom and for attack model O t ime . Nevertheless, the conclusion holds for all routines and attack models. Figure 4 captures the number of equivalence classes explored (hence, the number of patches generated cf. Algorithm 3) with respect to time. We make the following crucial observations from Figure 4 . Firstly, the scalability of our checker is stable across a variety of cache configurations. This is because we encode cache semantics within a program via symbolic constraints on cache conflict. The size of these constraints depends on the number of memoryrelated instructions, but its size is not heavily influenced by the size of the cache. Secondly, the number of equivalence classes of observations does not vary significantly across cache configurations. Indeed, the number of equivalence classes may even increase (hence, increased channel capacity) with a bigger cache size (e.g. in DES and AES). However, for all cache configurations, CACHEFIX generated all the patches that need to be applied for making the respective programs cache side-channel free.
The scalability of CacheFix is stable across a variety of cache configurations. Moreover, in all cache configurations, CacheFix generated all required patches to ensure the cache side-channel freedom w.r.t. O t ime . 
